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St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Duke University: The Fourth
Circuit Approves Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages
for Intentional Misconduct in North Carolina
Awards of punitive damages come in different sizes, are awarded on the
basis of many types of conduct,I and may further more than one public policy. 2
In North Carolina punitive damages serve two narrow purposes: to punish ag-
gravated misconduct and to deter such misconduct.3 In determining the
amount of a punitive damages award, jurors may consider the wealth of the
defendant to ensure that 'punitive damages actually serve as punishment.4
Although commentators advance public policy arguments against the prac-
tice, 5 increasingly courts have allowed defendants to insure themselves against
liability for punitive damages.6 Since 1985 the North Carolina Supreme Court
has expressly allowed insurance coverage for punitive damages based on grossly
negligent or reckless conduct. 7 Whether this coverage extends to punitive dam-
ages based on intentional misconduct is a question that remains unanswered by
the North Carolina judiciary. 8
This Note will critique the conclusion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Duke Univer-
sity9 (St. Paul) that North Carolina public policy does not preclude insuring
against punitive damages awards based on intentional misconduct. The Note
begins with a discussion of the reasoning applied at both the district and appel-
late court levels. Next, the Note presents an overview of the role that punitive
damages play throughout the United States and the relationship of insurance to
that role. It then focuses on the development of the law of punitive damages in
North Carolina leading up to the Fourth Circuit opinion in St. Paul. The Note
concludes that the federal appellate court incorrectly assessed North Carolina
law and public policy in determining that insurance policies can cover punitive
damages resulting from intentional misconduct.
In St. Paul the issue of insuring against punitive damages for intentional
misconduct came before the federal court in a declaratory judgment action
brought by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company.10 The declaratory judgment
1. Ervin, Postscript: Punitive Damages in North Carolina, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1255, 1257-59(1981).
2. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 1255.
3. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
4. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW Or TORTS § 2, at 15 (5th
ed. 1984).
5. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
7. See Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984); infra notes 97-
103 and accompanying text (discussion of Mazza).
8. See infra text accompanying note 104.
9. 849 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1988).
10. 670 F. Supp. 630, 631 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 849 F.2d 133 (4th Cir.
1988).
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was to determine St. Paul's contractual liability to pay punitive damages under
an insurance policy issued to Duke University."I The punitive damages in ques-
tion were awarded in a North Carolina state court action against Duke and one
of its employees for certain intentional acts.12
The district court used a two-step analysis to determine whether the terms
of the policy obligated St. Paul to pay Duke's punitive damages claims.' 3 The
first step required the court to determine whether the policy provided coverage
of punitive damages awards.' 4 The court relied on a "well established rul[e] of
construction"' 5 that requires the court to "construe the [insurance] contract
before it liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer."' 16 Applying
this rule of construction, the court concluded that the punitive damages assessed
against Duke were covered under the policy because the policy language was
"general and broad, with no specific exclusionary clause" for punitive
damages. 17
Having determined that the policy covered punitive damages, the court pro-
ceeded to the second step in its analysis: deciding whether North Carolina pub-
lic policy precludes insurance coverage of punitive damages awarded for
intentional torts.1 8 The district court recognized that public policy questions are
best left for legislative determination.' 9 Because North Carolina lawmakers had
not addressed the issue, however, the federal court was forced to do so.20
To resolve this issue, the district court looked to the public policy analysis
used by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Mazza v. Medical Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,21 a decision expressly allowing insurance coverage of punitive damages
11. Id. at 630.
12. Id. at 631. The events leading up to the declaratory judgment action began with a dispute
between two medical doctors employed by Duke University, Dr. Raymond U and Dr. Leonard R.
Prosnitz. The dispute centered on the ownership of, access to, and control of a Thermotron, a
machine used for experimental cancer research and treatment. In order to prevent access to the
machine, Dr. U removed parts and equipment from the machine in late March or early April 1984.
On April 4, 1984, the university obtained a temporary restraining order that required Dr. U to
return the parts of the machine that he had taken. A few months later, the parties reached a consent
agreement as to future ownership, use, and control of the machine and Duke voluntarily dismissed
the state court action on July 18, 1984. Id.
On October 3, 1984, Dr. U filed a state court action in the Superior Court of Durham County,
North Carolina. The complaint alleged several causes of action against Duke and Dr. Prosnitz
relating to the use of the Thermotron. On September 19, 1986, the jury awarded compensatory and
punitive damages to Dr. U for his malicious prosecution claim against Duke University and for his
libel and slander claims against Dr. Prosnitz. The punitive damages award included $1,000,000
against Duke for malicious prosecution and $50,000 against Dr. Prosnitz for libel and slander. Id.
13. Id. at 631-32. The court also held that the terms of the policy did not cover Dr. Prosnitz as
a Duke employee. Id. at 632-33. This Note will not address the court's discussion of that issue.
14. Id. at 633.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 631, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984)).
17. Id. at 634.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 635 (citing Gardner v. N.C. State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 293, 341 S.E.2d 517, 522
(1986)).
20. "[I]n the case before the Court, the North Carolina General Assembly has provided no
guidance for the resolution of a question the Court can not avoid." Id.
21. 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984).
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awarded for gross negligence. 22 As a starting point, the court recognized that
contract law requires enforcing contracts as written, absent compelling policy
considerations. 23 By contrast, the state's competing punitive damages policy is
to "punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from similar behavior." '24
Following the Mazza analysis, the court balanced the public policy interest
in enforcing insurance contract obligations against the competing interest in pre-
cluding coverage of punitive damages.25 The court distinguished authority such
as Mazza, which permits insurance coverage of punitive damages for gross negli-
gence,26 by stating that these cases "involve totally different concerns and pro-
vide little persuasive guidance in this case." 27 Instead, the court relied on
authority that would preclude coverage for punitive damages on policy
grounds.28 It concluded that insurance coverage of punitive damages for inten-
tional acts, as opposed to reckless or negligent acts, would "defea[t] the dual
purpose of punitive damages to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar con-
duct in the future."'29 According to the court: "The ground for 'interference'
[with freedom of contract] in a case involving insurance coverage for punitive
damages arising from intentional torts is ... compelling in that the purposes
served by insurance and punitive damages are diametrically opposed."'30
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court. 31 The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the issue
centered on the tension between the public policy that enforces contracts as writ-
ten to ensure commercial stability and the public policy against allowing individ-
uals to insure themselves against penalties for their misconduct. 32 The Fourth
Circuit panel reversed the district court, however, relying on two flaws it saw in
the district court's analysis. 33
The panel ruled that the district court had exceeded its authority in assess-
ing undetermined state policy. It held that the role of the federal courts to deter-
mine state public policy barring enforcement of contractual obligations was
limited to policy that is "well defined and dominant, and [which] is to be ascer-
22. St. Paul, 670 F. Supp. at 634-35. The district court limited its reliance on Mazza to the
form of its analysis. Because the Mazza court expressly reserved the question of insurance coverage
for punitive damages claims involving intentional acts, the conclusions of the case did not bear
directly on the issue before the court. Id. at 635.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 635-36 (quoting Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d
297, 302 (1976)).
25. Id.
26. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
27. The court distinguished the gross negligence cases, stating that "[t]he notion of spreading
the risk of punitive damages through insurance is more palatable in the arena of negligent conduct
than in the arena of intentionally tortious conduct, which by definition requires the intent to cause
the tortiously proscribed result with its concomitant heightened level of culpability." St. Paul, 670
F. Supp. at 636.
28. Id. at 636 n.16 (citing 14 state law cases).
29. Id. at 637.
30. Id.
31. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 849 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 135-36.
33. Id. at 136-37.
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tained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general con-
siderations of supposed public interests.' -34 Using this standard, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the district court had overstepped its authority in pre-
dicting North Carolina state policy. According to the court, "having found no
[existent state policy] the district court was bound to enforce the bargain as
made by the parties."3 5
Having determined that the district court erred in predicting North Caro-
lina public policy, the appellate court held that the lower court also made an
incorrect assessment of existing North Carolina policy.36 The court then pro-
ceeded to make its own policy assessment. 37 This portion of the panel's analysis
focused on case law holding that "[refusal] to enforce a contract covering puni-
tive damages for intentional acts would allow insurers to avoid an obligation for
which they bargained, and to be enriched unjustly."' 38 Based on this authority,
the court concluded that if Duke fulfilled its obligations under the contract by
paying premiums, St. Paul was required to pay Duke's punitive damages claim.
According to the court, a holding to the contrary "would... destroy to a large
extent the certainty on which our commercial system depends."'39
Although modem jury awards often include them, the concept of punitive
damages developed late in the history of the English common law.4° Awards of
punitive damages, sometimes called exemplary damages or smart money, began
in England during the mid-eighteenth century to compensate the injured plain-
tiff for nonphysical injuries and to punish the wrongdoer.4 1 Toward the end of
the eighteenth century, courts in the United States began to recognize the con-
cept of punitive damages as developed in England.4 2 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, United States courts broadened the concept of compensa-
tory damages to include intangibles such as mental anguish and pain and suffer-
ing.43 As a result, punitive damages were no longer necessary to compensate for
nonphysical injuries.44 By the 1830s, the increasing number of jury awards for
34. Id. at 135 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 373
(1987)).
35. Id. at 136 (focusing on the district court's reference to the Mazza opinion, which expressly
reserved the issue of insuring against punitive damages resulting from intentional acts). The appel-
late court believed that the district court had inferred from the Mazza court's express reservation of
the issue a de facto public policy rule against insuring against punitive damages arising from inten-
tional conduct. Id. While by no means the only possible construction of the district court's lan-
guage, this interpretation likely was reinforced by St. Paul's argument that the express reservation of
the issue by the Mazza court "indicates that that court would decide the question differently" for
intentional acts than it had with respect to negligent acts. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. (citing Koehring Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 303, 312 (E.D. Wis.
1983) and First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 232-43, 389 A.2d
359, 361-67 (1978)).
39. Id. at 137.
40. Bell & Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987).
41. Id.
42. Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. 501 (1 Hayw.) (1797); Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 90 (Sup.
Ct. 1791).
43. See Bell & Pearce, supra note 40, at 4.
44. Bell & Pearce, supra note 40, at 4.
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mental anguish shifted the focus of punitive damages away from compensation
to punishment and deterrence.
4 5
The function of punitive damages to punish and deter has survived and
exists in most American jurisdictions today.46 This role, however, has been at-
tacked in two ways. First, punitive damages in a civil action go against the basic
aim of the civil court system: to compensate an injured plaintiff, not to punish
a defendant for his wrongdoing.47 Following this reasoning, the only appropri-
ate forum to punish citizen misconduct is the criminal court system.48 Second,
both commentators and case law express doubt as to the efficacy of punitive
damages as a deterrent. At least eight jurisdictions have noted the ineffective-
ness of punitive damages in deterring misconduct.49 A task force for the Ameri-
can College of Trial Lawyers concluded that punitive awards "usually reflect the
jury's dissatisfaction with a defendant and their desire to punish him, without
regard to the true harm caused by the defendant's conduct."50
In response to these arguments, some jurisdictions have redefined the role
of punitive damages to encompass a compensatory function. 5 1 These jurisdic-
tions view punitive damages as a necessary evil offsetting the deficiencies of a
system that does not compensate plaintiffs for the cost of litigation.5 2 At least
one jurisdiction expressly limits punitive damages awards to the cost of litiga-
45. Bell & Pearce, supra note 40, at 4.
46. Note, Corporate Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Employee Acts, 11 J. CoRP.
L. 99, 100-01 (1985).
47. Editorial Comment and Annotations, Punitive Damages-Justifications, Criticisms and
Limitations, 30 DEF. L. J. 1.89, 202 (1981); see also Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reeval-
uation, 28 HASTINGS L.J 431, 434 (1976) (noting the distinction between civil and criminal law).
These challenges can be traced back as far as 1851. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,
371 (1851) (upholding the validity of punitive damages).
48. As stated by one commentator: "If conduct or practice is so inimical to public interest as to
deserve punishment, it should be discouraged by fines or other penalties as felonies, misdemeanors
and other statutory violations are punished." Editorial Comment and Annotations, supra note 47, at
202. At least one state, Indiana, will not allow a punitive damages award when the defendant may
be held criminally liable. See Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N.E. 289 (1926). Punitive
damages frequently are awarded against defendants not subject to criminal liability. In this situa-
tion, the question becomes whether a jury's determination that defendant has committed a wrong is
sufficient basis for punishment, absent legislative determination that the wrong merits a criminal
penalty.
49. These jurisdictions include Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, Ten-
nessee and Vermont. Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 DiCm. L. REV. 221, 229
& n.60 (1979); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussion of case law expressing doubt
about the deterrent effect of punitive damages).
50. Bell & Pearce, supra note 40, at 14; see also Note, supra note 47, at 434 (suggesting that the
punitive damages system would work more effectively if the awards were paid to the state).
51. Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REv. 239, 257-58 (1976); see,
e.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823, 827
(4th Cir. 1957) (barring insurance coverage for punitive damages is contrary to purpose and spirit of
liability policies to protect the public); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 196
(6th Cir. 1943) (noting that punitive damages claimants benefit from liability insurance).
52. See Editorial Comment and Annotations, supra note 47, at 202; Zuger, supra note 51, at
258. Such a view indicates dissatisfaction with the doctrine of compensatory damages. If the com-
pensatory system in fact is inadequate, it should be liberalized. The tort system should not use
punitive damages to serve a purpose for which they were not intended. See Note, supra note 47, at
435.
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tion.5 3 Other jurisdictions take a more subtle approach to plaintiff compensa-
tion through punitive damages, stating that they serve a dual role of punishment
and compensation.5 4
Not only do jurisdictions differ on the function of punitive damages, they
also split on whether public policy allows individuals to insure themselves
against punitive damages. Historically, the question was deemed a matter of
simple contract interpretation.5 5 In the 1960s, however, courts moved beyond
simple contract interpretation to add a second step to the analysis.5 6 Once a
court found that the insurance policy covered punitive damages, the second step
then determined whether public policy prohibited such coverage.5 7 Because
courts typically construe ambiguous contract language in favor of punitive dam-
ages coverage, 58 modem courts tend to focus on the second step in the
analysis. 59
Emphasizing this second step, two leading cases reached opposite conclu-
sions regarding insurance for punitive damages.60 Northwestern National Casu-
53. See Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 536-37, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941)
(Connecticut limits punitive damages awards to the cost of litigation).
54. See, e.g., Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437-38, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965) ("[Punitive]
damages are awarded ... as punishment and as a deterrent.... [They also] involve a compensatory
aspect."); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) ("Exem-
plary damages may be awarded... [as] punishment.., and may also include compensation for
inconvenience, reasonable attorney's fees, and other losses too remote to be considered under actual
damages.").
55. Brogdon, Insuring Punitive Damages: A Closer Look at Public Policy Analysis, 37 F.I.C.C.Q. 369, 373-74 (1987). Using this simple contract interpretation, sufficiently broad contract lan-
guage covered punitive damages. Id.
56. Brogdon, supra note 55, at 377-79; see Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 648-49, 383 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1964) (court uses a two-step analysis). Although this approach
gained momentum in the 1960s, as early as 1935 the Colorado Supreme Court applied a public
policy analysis. See Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 17, 39 P.2d 776, 779 (1934)
("The injured will not be allowed to collect from a nonparticipating party for a wrong against the
public.").
57. Brogdon, supra note 55, at 377-79.
58. See, eg., Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 322 (1928) (ambiguous con-
tract language construed in favor of the insured because the policy was prepared by the insurer);
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 203, 139 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1965) (ambiguous language construed
in favor of insured); but see Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 538, 18 A.2d 357,
359 (1941) (policy coverage for "liability imposed upon [the insured]... because of bodily injury"
construed not to include coverage for punitive damages); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Wackenhut
Corp., 442 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1984) (policy coverage of "damages because of bodily injury" does
not encompass coverage for punitive damages); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 99-100, 213
N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) (policy coverage of "damages because of bodily injury" construed not to
include punitive damages against man who pushed hatcheck girl).
59. See, e.g., Whalen v. On-Deck, Inc., 514 A.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Del. 1986) (Delaware public
policy does not prohibit insuring against punitive damages); Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395,
396-98, 744 P.2d 170, 171-73 (1987) (insuring punitive damages does not violate public policy);
Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Sup. 200, 212-14, 224 A.2d 793, 800 (1966) (Pennsylvania public policy
prohibits insuring against punitive damages for wanton misconduct); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia
Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 979-81 (Wyo. 1984) (Wyoming public policy allows insuring against
punitive damages).
60. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding
that insuring against punitive damages would offend public policy); Lazenby v. Universal Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647-49, 383 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1964) (holding that public policy would not
bar insuring punitive damages).
1989] 1415
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alty Co. v. McNulty 6' heads the line of cases barring insurance for punitive
damages as an affront to public policy. In McNulty the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined public policy relating to insurance cover-
age for punitive damages assessed against a drunken driver.62 The court began
its public policy analysis by defining the role of punitive damages in Florida. 63
The court concluded that in Florida punitive damages served to punish and de-
ter misconduct, not to compensate the injured party.64 In light of this function,
public policy "would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as well
[as] nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong."' 65 The court
further explained this policy:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a
freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanc-
tions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance
against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violations of public
policy. The same public policy should invalidate any contract of insur-
ance against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent. 66
This reasoning established the court's view that insurance should not cover pu-
nitive damages.
Two years after the Fifth Circuit decided McNulty, the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed the identical issue in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance CO.67 Like the McNulty court, the Tennessee court began its public policy
analysis by determining that in Tennessee punitive damages served to punish
and deter certain aggravated misconduct.6 8 Unlike the McNulty court, however,
the Lazenby court held that such policy concerns did not require voiding insur-
ance coverage for punitive damages. 69
The court based its conclusion on three factors. First, the court doubted
whether prohibiting insurance for punitive damages would actually further the
61. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
62. The claims in McNulty resulted from an automobile accident involving the defendant, a
drunken driver, who fled the accident scene. The plaintiff suffered severe injuries including perma-
nent brain damage. Id. at 433.
63. The court's choice of applicable state law is confusing. First, the court stated that Virginia
public policy would control because the contract was made and issued in that forum. The court,
however, quickly shifted its focus to Florida public policy because it was Florida law that imposed
the punitive damages. The court stated, "[Florida is] where the action was brought and the damages
awarded, and where the punitory and deterrent effects of the punitive damages awarded in this case
would have their greatest impact." Id. at 435.
64. Id. at 436. The court concluded further that the Florida courts' characterization of puni-
tive damages "conforms with the most widely accepted basis for punitive damages in other Ameri-
can jurisdictions." Id.
65. Id. at 440.
66. Id. The court expressly limited its holding to damages awarded with a view to punish and
deter individuals from "intentional or malicious wrongdoing, or, action or inaction having such a
conscious disregard of others that a jury might fairly infer from the circumstances of aggravation
that the wrong partakes of a criminal character, whether or not it is punishable as an offense against
the state." Id. at 442.
67. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
68. In Tennessee punitive "damages are allowed ... in negligence cases when there has been
some willful misconduct, or entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious
indifference to consequences." Id. at 646, 383 S.W.2d at 4.
69. Id. at 649, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
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deterrent goal of punitive damages.70 Second, the court recognized that, under
prevailing legal standards, consumers had a reasonable expectation that insur-
ance would cover punitive damages.7 ' Finally, the court noted that, in the face
of conflicting public policy considerations, insurance contracts should be en-
forced except in a clear case. 72 The court concluded that in light of these argu-
ments, the facts of Lazenby did not present a sufficiently clear case. 7 3
More than twenty years later, opinion remains split on whether Lazenby or
McNulty presents the more compelling argument. The majority of jurisdictions,
however, follow Lazenby and allow insurance coverage for punitive damages. 74
Commentators and later case law following this majority rule have noted at least
one additional argument in support of insuring punitive damages. This argu-
ment recognizes that punitive damages may serve a compensatory purpose. 75
Because of this compensatory function, no compelling policy outweighs freedom
of contract.
7 6
Some jurisdictions have modified the Lazenby rule by distinguishing be-
tween punitive awards for unintentional and intentional conduct.77 This distinc-
tion facilitates a compelling public policy argument against insuring punitive
damages resulting from intentional conduct. 7 8 Using this argument, a defend-
ant's culpability increases with the degree of control he has over his action, with
70. "[To say the closing of the insurance market, in the payment of punitive damages, would
act to deter guilty drivers would in our opinion contain some element of speculation." Id. at 647,
383 S.W.2d at 5. Later courts also have expressed skepticism as to the deterrent effect of punitive
damages. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 207-08, 567 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1977)
(finding no substantial relationship between insuring for punitive damages and the tendency of ag-
gravated misconduct); but see Price v. Hartford Accident and Ins. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d
522, 524 (1972) (holding that punitive damages will continue to deter misconduct because insurance
policies will not cover them completely).
71. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
72. Id. at 648-49, 383 S.W.2d at 5. This reasoning sustains numerous subsequent opinions.
Brogdon, supra note 55, at 383-89; see, e.g., Price, 108 Ariz. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524 (noting that
insurance companies must honor their obligations); Baker v. Armstrong, 106 N.M. 395, 396, 744
P.2d 170, 173-74 (1987) (using a consumer expectation analysis); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia
Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984) (noting that public policy against insuring punitive
damages is not compelling).
73. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 649, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
74. 1986 figures show that 22 jurisdictions allow insurance for punitive damages. Another six
jurisdictions allow insuring against punitive damages in cases of vicarious liability. Only eight juris-
dictions disallow insuring against punitive damages under any circumstances. Schumaier & McKin-
sey, The Insurability of Punitive Damages, 72 A.B.A. J. 68, 68-69 (March 1, 1986).
75. Note, supra note 47, at 444. Under similar reasoning, if a punitive award is based on vicari-
ous liability, there may be no policy argument against insurance coverage. See Note, Insurance
Coverage of Punitive Damages, 10 IDAHo L. REv. 263, 266 (1974); Schumaier and McKinsey, supra
note 74, at 70-72.
76. The leading case in support of this argument is Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127
Conn. 533, 538-39, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941). Tedesco permitted insurance coverage of punitive
damages because the purpose of awarding punitive damages is "'not to punish the defendant for his
offense but to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.'" Id. at 538, 18 A.2d at 359 (quoting
Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 578, 150 A.2d 692, 692-93 (1930)).
77. Morrison, Puniiive Damages and Why the Reinsurer Cares, 20 FORUM 73, 74 (1984). See,
e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ark. 1969) (driver
insured against punitive damages, assessed in part by analogy to allowance of employers to ensure
against punitive lability on basis of respondeat superior); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 504, 511 P.2d 783, 789 (1973) (negligent driver insured).
78. Indeed, insurance policies may not even cover compensatory damages if the insured's ac-
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culpability lowest for mere negligence and highest for intentional conduct.7 9 As
defendants' culpability increases, so must his personal responsibility for the con-
sequences of his action.80 Jurisdictions making this distinction allow insurance
coverage of punitive damages for negligent or reckless misconduct but bar cover-
age if the underlying misconduct is intentional.8 t
Although Lazenby represents the majority rule, a strong line of case law
and commentary has developed in support of McNulty.82 Criticisms of Lazenby
include a fear that allowing insurance coverage of punitive damages will pro-
mote wasteful awards,83 will allow insurers to control the public policy behind
punitive damages, 84 and will spread punitive liability among faultless policy
holders.8 5 One commentator suggests that the argument at the heart of Lazenby
does not concern insurance or freedom of contract at all, but rather stems from a
deep dissatisfaction with the system of punitive damages itself.86
North Carolina follows the Lazenby approach to insuring punitive dam-
ages,8 7 allowing insurance coverage for grossly negligent misconduct,88 while
the question whether punitive damages stemming from intentional misconduct
are insurable remains unresolved by the North Carolina judiciary. In North
Carolina punitive damages are available to plaintiffs, not as a matter of right, but
only when the tort contains elements of aggravated or outrageous misconduct.8 9
To incur punitive damages liability, defendant must inflict injury in a "'mali-
cious, wanton, and reckless manner.' "90 In addition to reserving punitive dam-
tions were intentional. See IB APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 462, at 305-07
(1981).
79. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 34, at 208-14 (explaining civil liability
distinctions based on different levels of culpable conduct).
80. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 34, at 208-14.
81. As of 1984, 11 of the 22 jurisdictions prohibiting insurance coverage of punitive damages
did so only if the punitive damages award derived from intentional conduct. Morrison, supra note
77, at 79-80.
82. See, eg., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966) ("Permitting the
penalty for the misdeed to be levied on one other than he who committed it cannot possibly imple-
ment [public] policy."); City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 42, 151 Cal,
Rptr. 494, 501 (1979) ("public policy of [California] prohibits insurance covering punitive dam-
ages"); Nicholson v. American Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 1965) ("a person
has no right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless and wanton actions
on someone else"); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. App. 1964) ("public policy should invali-
date any insurance contract against civil punishment that punitive damages represent").
83. Sprentall, supra note 49, at 231.
84. Note, supra note 75, at 270-71. Insurers obtain this control because they have the power to
insert clauses in insurance contracts exempting them from covering punitive damages. Id.
85. Zuger, supra note 51, at 251-52.
86. Sprentall, supra note 49, at 231-33. See American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527
(10th Cir. 1966) ("The question is not so much the efficacy of the policy underlying punitive dam-
ages; rather it is a question of the implementation of that policy."). Restructuring or abolishing the
punitive damages system would better address this dissatisfaction than would abrogating its purpose.
A review of the commentary that would abolish the system is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
good summary of the arguments, see 16A APPLEMAN, supra note 78, § 8879, at 464-70.
87. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
88. See Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 626, 319 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1985).
89. Ervin, supra note 1, at 1259 n.23 (listing various causes of action for which North Carolina
juries have assessed punitive damages).
90. Bryant v. Reedy, 214 N.C. 748, 759, 200 S.E.2d 896, 902 (1938) (quoting Ford v.
McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 421, 109 S.E. 91, 92 (1921)).
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ages for aggravated misconduct, the North Carolina courts have defined their
purpose narrowly. The North Carolina Supreme Court has described this
purpose:
Although some jurisdictions do allow punitive damages to compensate
the plaintiff for non-quantifiable compensatory damages .... North
Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on the basis
of its policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from
similar behavior. 91
This description leaves no room for the compensatory role recognized in other
jurisdictions. 92
Consistent with the narrow purpose of punitive damages to punish and de-
ter, in Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. 93 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals held that an insurance contract covering awards against the insured
for "personal injury" did not cover an award of punitive damages based on in-
tentional conduct. 94 In Cavin's, however, the court of appeals expressly reserved
the question whether public policy bars insurance coverage of punitive damages
in any event. 95 The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this issue more
than eight years later in Mazza v. Medical Mutual Insurance Co.9 6
In Mazza the court determined that North Carolina public policy did not
prohibit insuring against punitive damages arising from wanton or grossly negli-
gent conduct. 97 The court began by looking at the competing public policy doc-
trines of contract and tort, stating that "the right of parties to enter into
contracts is a valid and important public interest to consider in balancing the
competing interests involved."9 8 The court further noted the lack of legislative
restriction or regulation of the right to sell insurance which covers punitive dam-
ages.9 9 Finally, the court made an analogy to .the doctrine of respondeat supe-
91. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (emphasis
added). Punitive damages punish and deter through economic sanctions. To ensure that a punitive
damages award punishes a particular plaintiff, the jury may consider evidence of defendant's wealth
in determining the amount. Bryant, 214 N.C. at 759, 200 S.E. at 902; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 4, § 2, at 15.
Other areas of the law utilize similar theories of punishment and deterrence through economic
sanctions. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1982) (allowing civil penalties against banks of up to $1,000 per
day for banking violations); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (allowing treble damages recovery for antitrust
violations); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (allowing attorneys' fees assessment against government in civil
rights action).
92. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
93. 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d 403 (1975).
94. Id. at 704, 220 S.E.2d at 406; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 34 N.C. App.
96, 100, 237 S.E.2d 341, 345 (1977) (insurance policy use of the term "damages" deemed not to
include punitive damages).
95. Cavin's, 27 N.C. App. at 704, 220 S.E.2d at 407-08.
96. 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984).
97. Id. at 623, 319 S.E.2d at 219. The claim was based on a punitive damages award for medi-
cal malpractice. Id. at 621, 319 S.E.2d at 218.
98. Id. at 627, 319 S.E.2d at 221.
99. Id. The court relied on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-72 (1982). While this statute does not ex-
plicitly condone insuring against punitive damages, it does not expressly prohibit the practice either.
Further review of North Carolina insurance regulation reveals language expressly allowing an in-
surer to exclude coverage for punitive damages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-480 (1987). Implicit in
this language is the inference that, absent an exclusion, such coverage may be allowed.
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rior, which holds a master liable for his servant's punitive damages. t°
According to the court, allowing vicarious liability for punitive damages "refutes
the ... contention that public policy prohibits anyone other than the actual
wrongdoer or tortfeasor from paying punitive damages." 10 1
While the court concluded that North Carolina public policy does not pre-
clude insurance coverage for wanton or grossly negligent conduct, 0 2 the Mazza
decision did not completely resolve the issue in St. Paul. In Mazza the court
distinguished between punitive damages awards for intentional and uninten-
tional conduct.' 0 3 Based on this distinction, the court expressly declined to de-
termine whether public policy would prohibit a party from insuring herself
against the consequences of intentional acts. 104
Although the North Carolina judiciary has not determined whether insur-
ance can cover punitive damages awarded in civil actions for intentional miscon-
duct, it has ruled on an analogous issue, insurance coverage of criminal
penalties. Under North Carolina law, the general rule regarding insurance
against penalties for criminal acts is as follows:
[Alan insurance policy is void as against public policy if its intent is to
indemnify the insured against liability for his own criminal acts....
The general rule prohibiting insurance against liability for criminal
acts advances a legitimate public policy interest against relieving a
wrongdoer from responsibility for his own wilful and wrongful act, in
order that the commission of such acts not be encouraged.105
In Shew v. Southern Fire & Casualty Co. 106 the North Carolina Supreme Court
applied this general policy to restitution payments made by criminal defendants
to crime victims. The court held that insurance could not cover these payments
on public policy grounds. 10 7 In support of this conclusion, the court held that
"it is a basic proposition of public policy, requiring no citation of supporting
authority, that an insured is not allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing....
[Allowing insurance of criminal restitution payments would be] tantamount to
condoning insurance against the results and penalties of one's own criminal
100. Mazza, 311 N.C. at 627, 319 S.E.2d at 221. The court relied on Hairston v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942), which held a master responsible for the punitive
damages of his servant if the servant's misconduct occurred in the course and scope of the master's
business. Id. at 645, 18 S.E.2d at 168.
101. Mazza, 311 N.C. at 627-28, 319 S.E.2d at 221. The court failed to draw a clear distinction
between third party punitive damages liability through respondeat superior and punitive damages
liability through insurance coverage. An employer's ability to control employee conduct, in part,
justifies the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under the control theory, the employer is, to some
extent, at fault if an employee commits intentional or grossly negligent acts in the course of employ-
ment. Therefore, vicarious liability for punitive damages encourages the employer to hire carefully
and to oversee employee activity. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 69, at 500-01.
102. Mazza, 311 N.C. at 631, 319 S.E.2d at 223.
103. Id. at 626, 319 S.E.2d at 220.
104. Id.
105. Graham v. James F. Jackson Assoc., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 427, 432, 352 S.E.2d 878, 881
(1987) (insurance policy covers policeman convicted of involuntary manslaughter because conviction
could be based on negligent misconduct).
106. 307 N.C. 438, 298 S.E.2d 380 (1983).
107. Id. at 444, 298 S.E.2d at 384.
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acts."10 8
In summary, the North Carolina judiciary has determined that punitive
damages are not available as a matter of right'0 9 and serve only to punish and
deter aggravated misconduct. 110 Although the state courts have held that insur-
ance can cover punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct 1' and cannot
cover restitution payments resulting from a criminal penalty,1 2 neither the judi-
ciary nor the general assembly has ruled on whether insurance can cover puni-
tive damages resulting from intentional misconduct. 113
The Fourth Circuit's determination in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v.
Duke University 114 that North Carolina public policy allows insuring against
punitive liability' '1 is erroneous in light of North Carolina law in this area. The
appellate court first argued that the lower court overstepped its authority by
applying nonexistent state policy. 116 This argument lacks merit. Although no
North Carolina law directly on point exists, 1 7 the district court did not create
its analysis with smoke and mirrors.
Initially, the appellate court misconstrued the trial court's reference to
Mazza v. Medical Mutual Insurance Co. "18 The appellate court's argument be-
gan by stating that the North Carolina Supreme Court had not made a de facto
determination of the issue in question by expressly leaving the issue open in
Mazza. 119 The district court did not, however, rely on a de facto determination
of the issue left open in Mazza. The lower court referred to Mazza only to verify
that the issue was undetermined.120 The court stated that "cases such as Mazza
dealing with negligence cases involve totally different concerns and provide little
persuasive guidance in [determining state public policy].' 12 1
Rather than finding a de facto ruling, the district court looked at the policy
of punishment and deterrence behind punitive damages articulated by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Mazza. 122 Continuing its analysis, the court further
noted the significant distinction between punitive damages resulting from negli-
108. Id. Although the court pointedly distinguished criminal restitution payments from civil
liability, this distinction should not weaken this particular analogy because the Shew court referred
to compensatory rather than punitive damages in making this distinction. Id. at 442-43, 298 S.E.2d
at 382-83.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 20 & 22 and accompanying text.
114. 849 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1988).
115. Id. at 137; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
116. St. Paul, 849 F.2d at 136; see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying note 104.
118. St. Paul, 849 F.2d at 136; see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussion of the
trial court's reference to Mazza); supra note 35 (discussion of the court of appeals ruling on this
reference).
119. St. Paul, 849 F.2d at 136.
120. Id.
121. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 670 F. Supp. 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 849 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 635-36.
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gence and those resulting from intentional misconduct.123 The district court
clearly did not rely on an inferred holding in the Mazza opinion to determine
North Carolina public policy.' 24
A related factor, not considered by the district court, is North Carolina's
analogous policy toward insuring oneself against criminal sanctions. 125 The
North Carolina Supreme Court clearly and unequivocally has barred such cov-
erage, noting that public policy does not "[condone insuring oneselfl against the
results and penalties of one's own criminal acts." 1 26 A policy designed to punish
and deter intentional misconduct is more closely related to the policy behind
criminal sanctions such as restitution than to civil penalties for negligent con-
duct. Therefore, if the policy interests supporting criminal sanctions outweigh
the policy interests favoring freedom of contract, the policy interests behind pu-
nitive damages resulting from intentional misconduct should lead to the same
result.
In its second line of attack, the appellate court criticized the district court's
analysis of the conclusions of other jurisdictions with regard to insuring punitive
damages, 127 thus making the very same analysis for which it chastised the dis-
trict court earlier in its opinion. This criticism is not compelling. The Fourth
Circuit argued that although the district court cited numerous examples ofjuris-
dictions that preclude insuring against punitive damages for intentional acts,
other jurisdictions allow such coverage on the basis of "strong public policy
favoring enforcement of contracts."' 28 It appears that the district court did not
err by making a policy assessment, but rather by making an assessment with
which the appellate court did not agree.
As noted by the appellate court, some jurisdictions would allow insurance
coverage on these facts. This fact does not make the district court's conclusion
necessarily erroneous 129 because jurisdictions remain split in their analysis of
this issue.130 Furthermore, of the states that allow insurance coverage of puni-
tive damages arising from intentional acts, more than half interpret their availa-
123. Id. at 636; see supra note 27. The argument in favor of this distinction making a difference,
as regards insuring against punitive damages, is that intentional conduct is more culpable than negli-
gent conduct, and therefore warrants a higher degree of punishment. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text. This argument, however, may be better addressed by completely disallowing
punitive damages for negligent conduct.
124. In addition to the compelling state law arguments, the policy of substantial appellate court
deference to district court predictions in matters of state law weighs against the court of appeals
decision in St. Paul. See Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 788 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1983). This deference is based on the premise that a district court is more familiar with the law
and the prevalent judicial climate of the state in which it sits. Id.
125. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
126. Shew v. Southern Fire & Casualty Co., 307 N.C. 438, 444, 298 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1983)
(emphasis added).
127. The appellate court could not "accept the district court's reliance on the 'persuasive weight
of authority' from other jurisdictions in determining that North Carolina's public policy would pro-
hibit insurance coverage ofpunitive damages arising from intentional acts." St. Paul, 849 F.2d at 136
(4th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
128. SL Paul, 849 F.2d at 136.
129. This is true particularly in light of the policy of deference to district court predictions of
state law.
130. See supra note 74.
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bility and scope more broadly than does North Carolina.13 ' The district court's
conclusion disallowing coverage for punitive damages follows logically from the
narrow focus of punitive damages in this state.1 32
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals should not have reversed the district
court's determination that insuring against punitive damages liability resulting
from intentional misconduct violates North Carolina public policy. An analysis
of both North Carolina punitive damages law and the law on this issue in other
jurisdictions weighs heavily in favor of prohibiting such insurance on public pol-
icy grounds. In order to mitigate further misinterpretation of North Carolina
public policy in this area, the North Carolina Supreme Court or the general
assembly must speak to this issue quickly and clearly. 133 Once either body has
spoken, it will be clear to the federal judiciary that insuring oneself against puni-
tive damages resulting from intentional acts offends both the letter and the spirit
of North Carolina law and public policy.
MELINDA C. BURROWS
131. See supra note 74.
132. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
133. A recent administrative report indicates that the executive branch of North Carolina gov-
ernment agrees with this analysis. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, N.C. DEFr. OF ADMIN.,
REPORT ON THE NORTH CAROLINA TORT SYSTEM, 27 (1988) (on file at the North Carolina Law
Review).
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